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represents the Maryland view and also the ma-
jority of American jurisdictions.
(2) Where the grant is to a husband and wife and
there are qualifying words, the husband and wife
do not take as tenants by the entireties, the qualify-
ing words overruling the presumption to the con-
trary. This represents the Maryland view, but is
in the minority in other American jurisdictions.
(3) Where the grant is to a husband and wife and a
third party stranger and there are no qualifying
words, the husband and wife take one-half as
tenants by the entireties and the third party takes
the other half as tenants in common. This is the
Maryland view and probable weight of authority
in American jurisdictions.
(4) Where the grant is to a husband and wife and a
third party stranger and there are qualifying
words, the husband and wife do not take as tenants
by the entireties but take as individuals subject to
the qualifying words in the absence of a clear con-
trary intent. This is the Maryland view (repre-
sented by this case) but is probably the minority
view in other American jurisdictions.
INSURANCE - ISOLATED INSTANCE OF CARRYING
FOR HIRE NOT "PUBLIC OR LIVERY CON-
VEYANCE" WITHIN POLICY EXCLUSION
Stanley v. American Motorists Ins. Co.1
Appellee issued a policy of insurance to Pfeiffer, apply-
ing to a truck owned by him, which contained the following
exclusion clause:
"This policy does not apply (a) while the automo-
bile is used as a public or livery conveyance, unless
such use is specifically described in ihe policy and
premium charged therefore."
173 A. 2d 1 (Md., 1950).
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Use as a public or livery conveyance was not described in
the policy nor was a premium charged for such use. During
the policy period a club to which the appellant belonged
arranged a picnic. Tickets were sold to the members of
the picnic group to pay for their transportation to the
picnic grounds. The sum of eighteen dollars was collected
and given to the insured's employee, Johnson, who was to
drive the members to the picnic area. Johnson was not
acting as the agent or servant of the insured on this occasion
but he did have permission to use the truck. Neither the
insured nor Johnson was in the business of carrying pas-
sengers for hire and this was the first instance of its kind.
On the way to the picnic grounds an accident occurred
which resulted in injury to appellant, a passenger on the
insured's truck. As a result of this injury, a default judg-
ment was obtained against the insured. The insurance car-
rier then instigated an action against the insured and the
injured party asking for a declaratory judgment on the
policy. The lower court held the use was within the ex-
clusion clause and that the policy did not apply to this
accident. The Court of Appeals reversed this ruling.
In both the Court of Appeals and the lower court the
case resolved on the single question: does one such isolated
use, as in this factual situation, constitute a use as a "livery
or public conveyance"? That such a question came to the
Court of Appeals after several decades of mass auto opera-
tion and literally millions of relatively serious accidents
is explained by the change that occurred in automobile
policies during the last war. Prior to our entry into the
war the standard policy exclusion was to the effect that the
policy would not apply while passengers were being carried
for a consideration. With the war and its resultant short-
ages of rubber and gasoline, the car pool became a popular
and necessary association of most working people. The
insurance companies changed their policies and narrowed
the exclusion so as to bar coverage while the automobile
is used as a public or livery conveyance, but not prevent
"sharing the ride".
It is suggested in the appellee's brief that the word
"while" in the phrase "while the automobile is used as a
public or livery conveyance" is-significant and serves to
refute the appellant's claim that the use must be repeated
and have occurred on numerous occasions to be excluded.
This emphasis on the word "while" ignores the meaning
of the words "public or livery conveyance", for the auto-
mobile can not be used "as" a public or livery conveyance
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unless, like such a conveyance, it is used or held out for
use for hire on repeated occasions.
The appellee's contention rested on cases involving the
older exclusion "While the vehicle is being used for the
carrying of persons for a consideration or hire" or similar
phrases. In those cases a single instance of such use was
held to bring the use within the exclusion clause and to
allow the insurer to avoid liability for accidents arising in
the course of such use. However, the distinction between
such clauses and the one in the instant case is immediately
obvious as the meaning of the older exclusion does not rest
on the words "public or livery conveyance". Hence the
decisions cited by the insurer and the dicta therein must
be considered in the light of the earlier broader exclusion
and when so considered it is seen that none of these cases
applies to the present problem.
Mittet v. Home Insurance Co.,2 cited by the insurer, in-
volved the exclusion "if the automobile described herein
shall be used for carrying passengers for compensation, or
rented or leased". Under this broad exclusion the court
held for the insurer. Realizing the importance of the words
"public or livery conveyance" the insurer in the instant
case says the court referred to the use in the Mittet case
as being used for livery purposes. A closer look at the case
reveals that the word "livery" was used in a paragraph
dealing only with the question of whether or not the in-
sured had knowledge of the use, and which merely referred
to the charge of the trial court, wherein the word "livery"
was used. It was truly not an attempt to define the word,
as such definition was not required.
Myers v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp.' also in-
volved the broader clause. In referring to this case the in-
surer quotes the court as saying:
"Not only was this arrangement (to carry passen-
gers for compensation) contrary to the literal word
of the exclusion clause but it also violated its purpose
and its intent by an increase in the risk; that the in-
surer might become liable to pay a passenger for dam-
ages to them resulting from the negligent operation of
the automobile."4
1207 N. W. 49 (S. D., 1926). The insured's son on a single occasion trans-
ported for a consideration a passenger from the insured's farm to a nearby
town.
99 F. 2d 485 (4th Cir., 1938).
'Appellee's Brief, p. 13 (No. 145, Oct. Term, 1949).
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In the case we are considering we do have an increase of
risk but this also must be considered in the light of the
different exclusion clauses. The policy in the Myers case
was meant to exclude the increased risk of carrying pas-
sengers for a compensation while the policy in our case is
so worded as to exclude only the increased risk incurred
in using the car for purposes of a "public or livery convey-
ance". The distinction between the two exclusions con-
tinues to stand.
Broadway Auto Livery v. State Board of Public Roads5
was used in an attempt to define livery service and the
court was quoted:
"The proprietor of a livery stable was not at com-
mon law a common carrier, for the reason that he did
not hold himself out as being willing to carry passen-
gers indiscriminately. There was an element of choice
in the transaction both on the part of the proprietor
and the person desiring transportation.... Transpor-
tation of this kind was usually a matter of prearrange-
ment as to time, type of vehicle, destination, and
charges."
The insurer puts his emphasis on the last sentence and
states that it applies to the instant case. However, in the
case cited the court was not dealing with a single instance
but with a case where the defendant in effect ran a taxi
business and had not complied with state regulations, the
defense being that his vehicles were being used in "livery
service" and were not taxis. The court there was concerned
with the maximum use to which a vehicle could be used in
"livery service" whereas we are concerned with the mini-
mum use that will bring a vehicle within that classification.
In the opinion in the Broadway Auto Livery case there is
no implication that a single use for hire would constitute a
vehicle a "livery conveyance".
In support of the decision in the instant case we find
several adequate definitions of the words in question. Elliot
v. Behner a decision involving the same exclusion clause
with which we are here concerned, contains the following
syllabus statement:
"The term 'public conveyance' means a vehicle used
indiscriminately in conveying the public, and not
limited to certain persons and particular occasions or
5 158 A. 375, 376 (R. I., 1932).
0 150 Kan. 876, 96 Pac. 2d 852 (1939).
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governed by special terms. The words 'public convey-
ance' imply the holding out of the vehicle to the general
public for carrying passengers for hire. The words
'livery conveyance' have about the same meaning."
This same definition is adopted by the courts in Pimper
v. National American Fire Ins. Co..' Allor v. Dubay,s and
McDaniel v. Glen Falls Indemnity Co.9 In the latter case
the court repeated the axiom for interpreting insurance
policies that no strained or unnatural construction of the
policy would be adopted and that the policy must be con-
strued most favorably to the insured. A similar definition,
adopted in Concordia Fire Ins. Co. of Milwaukee v. Nelson,"0
would also seem to exclude single instances where the in-
sured is not actively engaged in the livery business. The
decision in Wood v. Merchants Ins. Co. of Providence11 also
supports the instant case.
The decisions are as yet sparse because of the relative
newness of the present exclusion clause; however, those
rendered to date indicate that just as the broader clause
was held, almost universally, to exclude a single use, the
newer and narrower clause will not exclude coverage unless
the use as a public or livery conveyance has been frequent
and usual, or, as in the Concordia Fire Ins. Co. case, special
facts clearly label the vehicle as a "livery conveyance".
In concluding its opinion, the Court of Appeals reasoned
further that the insurer in issuing the policy with the
narrower exclusion clause might be considered to have
"adopted" "the uniform judicial construction that it has re-
ceived in other states", having found that "most of the re-
ported cases in which -the narrower clause has been con-
strued were decided before the policy in suit was issued".s
This reasoning, at least, relates the opinion more nearly to
the pragmatic approach of construing a policy in relation to
139 Neb. 100, 296 N. W. 465, 467 (1941).S317 Mich. 281, 26 N. W. 2d 772, 774 (1947).
333 Ill. App. 596, 78 N. E. 2d 111, 113 (1948).
" 221 S. W. 2d 320 (Tex., 1949). An owner of a car rental firm rented his
own personal auto to a customer. It was held that this was a use as a
"livery conveyance". The Court said, p. 322:
"Appellee was engaged in a business that is now subject to the same
laws applicable to livery stables, the automobile having supplemented
horse-drawn carriages as a means of transportation. The generally
accepted definition of a livery stable is: 'A place where horses are
groomed, fed, and hired, and vehicles are kept for hire'."
291 Mich. 573, 289 N. W. 259 (1939). A schoolboy carried fellow students
along to school for a consideration. The words of the exclusion "used as a
public or livery conveyance for carrying passengers for compensation" were
held not to exclude such use.
Supra, n. 1, 4.
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the insurance coverage which the company purported to
sell for the premium paid. For, if the company chose to
issue the policy with a narrower exclusion clause after
similar narrow clauses had been construed by the courts
as above indicated, it is not unfair to assume that the com-
pany had appraised the risk accordingly.
SHOULD REVERSAL OF CRIMINAL CONVICTION
BECAUSE OF INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE, UNDER
THE NEW CRIMINAL RULES, BE WITH OR
WITHOUT A NEW TRIAL?*
Lambert v. State'
This case marks the first time since the adoption of the
new Criminal Rules of Practice and Procedure2 that the
Court of Appeals has reversed a criminal conviction where
the appeal was based upon an alleged insufficiency of the
evidence legally to sustain the conviction. Authority to
review the sufficiency of the evidence was based upon Rule
7 (c) of the new rules of criminal practice and procedure
which relates to non-jury trials and provides that "Upon
appeal the Court of Appeals may review upon both the
law and the evidence to determine whether in law the evi-
dence is sufficient to sustain the conviction, but the verdict
of the trial court shall not be set aside on the evidence un-
less clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses."4
Appellants Lambert, Carr, Salfner and Alder were tried
jointly by the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, sitting
without a jury, on charges of violating the gambling laws.
The charges were contained in two informations, one alleg-
ing that appellants had engaged in bookmaking on October
25, 1949, and the other alleging that appellants had en-
gaged in the same activities on October 26, 1949. All the
* See Editorial Supplement to this casenote, immediately following it.
175 A. 2d 327 (Md., 1950).
1 Promulgated by the Court of Appeals on December 6th, 1949. Amended
on February 15, 1951.
8 See editorial, Criminal Procedure Reform Achieved in Maryland, 11 Md.
L. Rev. 319-324 (1950). For a discussion of the law in Maryland before the
adoption of the new rules, see note, Difeulty of Obtaining Appellate Rulings
on Substantive Criminal Law - Corroboration of Accomplices, 1 Md. L. Rev.
175 (1937).
' Effective January 1st, 1950.
